The United States and the World: Where Are We Headed? by Mark Weisbrot
Conference Presentation • September 2008 
 
 
Center for Economic and 
Policy Research 
1611 Connecticut Ave, NW 
Suite 400 
Washington, DC 20009 
tel: 202-293-5380 
fax:: 202-588-1356 
www.cepr.net 
The United States and the World: 
Where Are We Headed? 
 
BY MARK WEISBROT * 
 
Introduction 
 
The United States appears to be embarking on a transition on two major fronts: its 
own economy, both financial and real; and its relations with the rest of the world. 
There is some relation between these two transitions. Some of these changes will 
depend on the outcome of the U.S. national election in November, and some will 
not. This paper will present a brief overview of current trends, with some attention 
given to U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, as well as other areas. 
 
US Economic Prospects and Their Implications 
 
At the time of this writing all eyes are on the financial crisis currently facing the 
United States and international financial markets, which is widely considered to be 
the worst such crisis since the Great Depression. There is indeed a serious crisis in 
the financial sphere, as indicated by events of the last week, especially the freezing 
up of credit markets. The great fear on the down side is that this could lead to a 
widespread collapse of parts of the financial system. This was illustrated most 
vividly last week when some $224.3 billion was withdrawn from money market 
mutual funds, which investors had previously treated as though they were as safe as 
a checking account.1 There are about $3.4  trillion in these accounts. If this panic 
had spread, it could have amounted to something like a modern-day run on the 
banking system. Fortunately, however, the Treasury intervened quickly and 
announced that it would insure these funds, which were previously outside its 
system of federal deposit insurance. 
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These and other massive and unorthodox interventions indicate that the US authorities, including the 
Federal Reserve (in conjunction with other central banks such as the ECB and BOJ) and Treasury 
Department, are willing to do whatever is necessary in order to prevent a major breakdown in the financial 
sphere. They have engaged in the largest nationalizations and the largest transfer of debt in world history 
(the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), as well as the nationalization of the country’s largest 
insurer (AIG), and pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into the banking system in response to liquidity 
crunches. 
 
Given this willingness of the authorities to do whatever is necessary to prevent a run on deposits (now 
including money market mutual funds) and the freezing up of credit, the threat of a generalized collapse of 
the financial system appears to be exaggerated. More likely there will be more strains on the system as 
insolvent institutions go under – just as the disorderly collapse of Lehman Brothers precipitated the 
current crisis – and other unexpected events occur, in a process of “de-leveraging” and shrinking the 
bloated and over-leveraged financial sector. The sector has more than tripled as a share of GDP over the 
post-war period and before the recent downturn had accounted for more than 30 percent of corporate 
profits. Much of this profit was illusory and has since disappeared, as we are now seeing. 
 
The current struggle over the conditions attached to the Bush Administration’s proposed $700 billion 
bailout are a more likely indicator of the battles ahead. It will be a fight over the distribution of losses – 
taxpayers and homeowners on the one hand, versus shareholders, CEO’s, and investors in the financial 
sector on the other hand.  The Administration last week posed the question as one of “give us a blank 
check or risk financial collapse.” This was rejected by a populist revolt in both parties, and it appears that 
there will be at least some conditions imposed on the bailout. But given the power that the financial sector 
wields in the U.S. political system, these will fall far short of some very feasible and practical reforms that 
would protect homeowners, force the investors and executives who made bad decisions to absorb their 
share of the losses, and implement the regulatory reforms necessary to prevent a repeat in the future. (For 
an overview of such reforms and guidelines to a proper bailout, see Dean Baker, Progressive Conditions 
for a Bailout).2 Nonetheless these political battles will probably continue over the next couple of years. 
 
There is a confusion in most of the public discussion of the state of the U.S. economy. The current 
economic problems are seen as overwhelmingly a financial crisis, when in fact there are major problems in 
the real economy that are dragging the economy into a serious recession.  In other words, even if the 
problems in the financial sector are resolved, it would not prevent this recession from deepening. We are 
currently experiencing a recession that was brought on by the bursting of a massive housing bubble, one 
that created some $8 trillion of illusory wealth before it began to burst in mid-2006. 
 
This bubble is only about 60 percent deflated, and that assumes that there is no overshoot in the other 
direction at the bottom. The arithmetic is fairly straightforward3: from 1996 to 2006, U.S. home prices rose 
by about 70 percent above the rate of inflation. Prior to this, home prices over the long term did not rise 
faster than inflation. This means that home prices would have to fall about 40 percent to reach trend 
levels; in real terms (including inflation), they have so far fallen about 25 percent. 
 
There remains a large oversupply of housing in the United States, and homeowners are currently receiving 
foreclosure notices at the rate of about 3.6 million a year. In addition to the impact of the shrinking of 
construction and housing-related sectors, an even more important impact of the bursting housing bubble 
on the economy is through the wealth effect. U.S. households typically borrow against the equity in their 
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homes, and the expansion of the U.S. economy from the end of the last recession (November 2001) to last 
year was largely driven by this borrowing. At the peak of the bubble in 2006, consumers were cashing out 
some $780 billion a year from (then rapidly rising) home equity. Much of this borrowing and spending has 
come to an end. In the next quarterly GDP report (3rd quarter) we may see a drop in consumer spending, 
which has so far held up despite the collapse of the housing bubble.  
 
Over the last four quarters of data, the main contributor to economic growth has been an improvement in 
the trade balance, as a result of the steep slide of the dollar (about 25 percent against a trade-weighted 
basket of currencies) that began in 2002.4 But trade is only about 26 percent of the U.S. economy; 
consumer spending is 70 percent. And the labor market has weakened to recession levels: unemployment, 
at 6.1 percent, is almost at its September 2003 peak from the last recession, and employment as a 
percentage of population is near its trough from the last recession. The economy has shed jobs at a rate of 
81,000 per month over the last quarter, and real wages are falling.5 All of this will feed back into the 
housing market and also weaken consumer spending. In addition, the state and local government sector, 
which has so far been adding jobs, will contract in the near future as these governments begin to cut back 
spending (most have to balance their budgets) in response to falling revenues. The New York City 
government recently announced $1.5 billion in spending cuts over the next 15 months. 
 
In other words, the U.S. downturn is just beginning, and will accelerate even if the problems in the 
financial sector were to be resolved in the most efficient manner possible. More likely, problems in the 
financial sector as it rids itself of insolvent institutions and bad debt will contribute to the downturn 
through restricting the availability of credit and undermining investor confidence generally. 
 
This leads to what will be the next major battle over economic issues, after the financial crisis is resolved: 
fiscal policy. An expansionary fiscal policy will be needed to mitigate the effects of the recession, which is 
very likely to be the worst in at least a quarter-century. The Fed has already cut the Federal Funds rate 
from 5.25 percent to 2.0 percent, and so does not have much farther to go. But monetary policy cannot 
have even a small fraction of the expansionary effect that it had on the last recession, when it contributed 
to the massive expansion of the housing bubble. It is long-term rates that have the much larger impact on 
economic activity in the United States, and lowering the short-term rate does not necessarily lower long-
term rates; in fact the 10-year Treasury markets have reacted several times to recent Fed rate cuts with 
rising yields. Furthermore, the Fed is much more worried about inflation now, with the CPI at 7.2% over 
the last year (core at 3.4%), as compared to 2.9% at the onset of the last recession (core at 2.7%). 
 
Given the ineffectiveness of further interest rate cuts, fiscal policy will be the main potential tool for 
counter-cyclical policy in the near future. However, the national debt is already more than 67 percent of 
GDP; the current bailout will push this over 72 percent and there will probably be more bailouts (e.g. the 
re-funding of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which cannot possibly deal with likely bank 
failures) as well as further deficit increases due to automatic spending increases and revenue declines as the 
economy weakens. These are levels of public debt that have not been seen since the early 1950s, when the 
debt was still winding down from its explosive growth during World War II.  Of course it would still be 
best policy during a recession to ignore these debt levels and proceed with a large fiscal stimulus package – 
especially since the bailouts, while adding to the debt, do not have the same effect on demand as other 
forms of deficit spending would. However, there remains a strong prejudice in the U.S. political system, in 
both political parties and in the media, against doing so. The size and growth of the national debt is a 
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major issue in political campaigns, including the presidential campaign, and many Democrats in recent 
years have often been more conservative than Republicans on this issue. 
 
Therefore, the depth and destructiveness of the current recession may well depend on how much the next 
government is willing to ignore this economic dogma and stimulate the economy. During the last recession 
the federal government went from a 2.4 percent of GDP fiscal surplus to a 3.5 percent deficit (2000-2003); 
and this was in conjunction with the interest rate cuts (from 6 percent in May 2000 to 1 percent in June 
2003) and massive growth of the housing bubble. Currently, the Federal Funds rate is already at 2 percent 
and the federal budget deficit (using the unified budget that is customarily reported) is at 3.3 percent of 
GDP, not including the current bailouts. 
 
While the authorities have so far proven quite flexible in response to the financial crisis – massive 
nationalizations, debt accumulation, and even a tolerance for higher inflation and inflation risks that are 
unusual for the Federal Reserve – it is not at all clear that the next government, regardless of who wins the 
election, will be willing to abandon fiscal conservatism as needed to help pull the economy out of 
recession. Most likely they will not make the kinds of mistakes that the Japanese government made after 
their stock market and real estate bubble burst in 1989; and the U.S. has other advantages, especially with 
regard to the dollar as the key currency in the international economy, that will make it easier for the United 
States to avoid falling into a prolonged period of stagnation. Nonetheless there is plenty of room for this 
recession to be much longer than necessary if there are policy failures. 
 
Leaving aside for the moment the depth and length of the recession, and its dependence on policy 
responses, the current economic juncture is likely to leave lasting effects on the U.S. economic system, and 
because of U.S. influence, much of the world. Some of this has already taken place. The five top U.S. 
investment banks are no more: Bear Stearns collapsed earlier this year, Lehman went bankrupt, Merrill 
Lynch agreed to be bought by Bank of America; Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs gave up investment 
bank status.  This brings them all within the Federal Reserve’s regulatory system. 
 
What lasting impact can we expect, after the economy has recovered? We can expect some regulatory 
reform in the U.S. financial system to reduce at least some of the abuses that led to the collapse. It remains 
to be seen whether such progressive reforms as a financial transactions tax, which could reduce 
speculation and raise upwards of $100 billion annually in revenue, will have a chance. 
 
Since this is the second recession in seven years that was caused by the bursting of an asset bubble, it is 
possible that the Fed will change its view of such speculative bubbles and begin to monitor them and try 
to counteract them. The position until now of Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke has been that the Fed 
should not try to do anything about asset bubbles until after the fact.6 However this does not make sense; 
the stock market bubble was identifiable and identified in the late 1990s, and the same is true for the 
housing bubble beginning in 2002.7 Also, the Fed does not necessarily have to raise interest rates in order 
to counter-act a growing asset bubble; much can be done to rein in speculation through informing 
investors and the public of the dangers of investing in bubble-inflated assets, as well as other regulatory 
measures.8 This is important because although it is now recognized that there were regulatory failures, e.g. 
in the case of the sub-prime mortgage market, that contributed to the current crisis, it is not widely known 
that failure to contain the bubble itself – which could have been done – is the single largest cause of the 
damage that we are seeing today.  
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The shrinking of the U.S. trade deficit during this recession will adjust, at least to some extent, one of the 
biggest imbalances in the global economy. For the United States, it may help to restore the conditions for 
sustainable growth. Since the 1990s U.S. economic growth has been largely dependent on bubble-driven 
consumption, first from the stock market bubble and then the housing bubble. One reason for this is the 
United States’ large and – until last year – growing trade deficit, which is a result of an overvalued dollar. 
Since the trade deficit, as a matter of accounting, reduces growth, the economy needs another source of 
demand to compensate. Bubble-driven consumption has played that role until now, but will no longer be 
necessary if the dollar’s decline – plus the effect of the recession in shrinking demand for imports – 
reduces the trade deficit to a sustainable level.  
 
After this recession, the influence of neoliberal ideas, which have their strongest base internationally in the 
United States, will emerge somewhat weaker. The libertarian variant espoused by the late Milton Friedman 
has already declined precipitously in recent years, and it will be increasingly difficult to make a serious 
argument for this kind of “free market” fundamentalism in the coming years. But what of the more 
mainstream neoliberal ideas, often inaccurately labeled as “free market,” or “free trade?” In reality, these 
policies have dismantled market barriers when such changes would drive down wages or redistribute 
income upward (e.g. international trade in manufacturing), while supporting protectionism and non-market 
solutions when this redistributed income upward (e.g. increased patent protection for pharmaceuticals, 
restricted competition in professional employment, CEO pay).9 These ideas too will be weakened 
somewhat in the years ahead. In some respects it may be similar to what happened after Japan’s collapse in 
1989, although a milder version. Prior to 1989, Japan’s industrial policy and export led growth were widely 
admired as successful economic policies; after the collapse of Japan’s stock market and real estate bubble 
and the ensuing stagnation in the 1990s, Japan was no longer seen as an example to be emulated. 
 
There has been a powerful effort in recent years, in the most important European political and media 
circles, to push Europe in the direction of emulating the United States, which is portrayed as a more 
dynamic and successful form of capitalism. It is widely believed that the Eurozone countries cannot afford 
their welfare state in the new global economy, and that labor market regulation and unions have increased 
unemployment and undermined productivity growth. The economic evidence for these arguments has 
been entirely lacking,10 but they helped elect French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, and the German 
Social Democratic Party leadership has repeatedly defied its own voters by trying to move in this direction. 
These ideas are likely to lose some steam as the reality of the current crisis and U.S. recession are presented 
to the European public. Neoliberal ideas are likely to lose some credibility in developing countries as well; 
they have already fallen sharply in popularity in Latin America over the last decade. 
 
The U.S. recession will also reduce its influence in the world more generally, which has been falling rapidly 
under the Bush Administration. 
 
US Foreign Policy in Years Ahead 
 
It is generally agreed that Washington has lost considerable influence and prestige in the world in recent 
years, most importantly due to most of the world’s rejection of Washington’s invasion of Iraq, but also 
other international scandals and human rights abuses (secret detention centers, Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, 
extra-ordinary rendition and torture), as well as a generally unilateralist and “with us or against us” posture 
espoused by the Bush Administration. 
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There are other reasons for the decline of U.S. influence that are in some cases greater contributing factors 
but have received very little attention. The most important of these is the collapse of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).11 This was the most important avenue of U.S. influence in developing countries for 
the past three decades. The IMF was positioned, by informal arrangement, at the top of a creditors’ cartel. 
Governments who did not reach agreements with the Fund on various economic policies were in most 
cases denied credit not only from the IMF, but from the larger World Bank, other multi-lateral lenders 
such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the governments of rich countries, and sometimes even 
the private sector. This gave Washington, which has dominated the IMF since its inception in 1944, a 
powerful lever to promote a whole series of economic reforms in developing countries. 
 
Over the last decade this leverage has virtually collapsed in middle-income countries. Although some poor 
countries, especially in Africa, are still subject to IMF conditions, almost all of the middle-income 
countries are not. In the last four years the IMF's total loan portfolio has shrunk from $105 billion to less 
than $10 billion. The organization itself is currently running a $400 million annual deficit and has been 
forced to downsize. 
 
The collapse of the IMF has greatly contributed to Washington’s loss of influence in Latin America. Most 
of the governments in the region are now more independent of Washington than Europe is. This is also 
because left-of-center governments have been elected in the last decade in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. A major reason for this 
revolt at the ballot box has been the economic failure of neoliberal policies that were actively promoted by 
Washington and the multilateral institutions where it holds sway, including the IMF, World Bank, and 
IADB. From 1960-1980 the region’s per capita income grew by 82 percent. From 1980-2000 it grew by 
only 9 percent, and despite a few good years recently, it has grown by only 14 percent in the current 
decade. Even ignoring the distribution of income, which is the most unequal of any in the world and has 
worsened in some countries, Latin America’s long-term economic growth and development failure in the 
neoliberal era is unprecedented in its modern history.12 
 
Washington’s response to Latin America’s leftward shift has accelerated its loss of influence in the region. 
The Bush Administration supported the military coup against the elected government of Venezuela in 
2002, and then continued to fund and support opposition groups and tacitly support serious 
destabilization efforts (including the 2002-2003 oil strike) after the coup. Teodoro Petkoff, currently one 
of the most prominent and respected leaders of the Venezuelan opposition in international circles, recently 
described the opposition “strategy that overtly sought a military takeover” from 1999-2003, and its use of 
the oil industry for purposes of overthrowing the government.13 
 
Washington’s support for this strategy, and continued support for the Venezuelan opposition to this day 
has created a serious rift with Venezuela. Instead of trying to re-establish normal relations with Venezuela, 
for example through direct talks, it has engaged in a continuing series of hostile actions that seemed 
designed to provoke enmity – most recently threatening to put Venezuela on a list of nations designated as 
“state sponsors of terrorism.”14  
 
In addition, Washington has pursued a strategy of trying to isolate Venezuela from its neighbors. This has 
also backfired and served more to isolate the United States rather than Venezuela in the region. The Bush 
                                                
11 For an overview of this collapse since the Asian Financial Crisis see Weisbrot (2007) 
12 For more on the decline of U.S. influence in Latin America, see Weisbrot (2006).  
13 Petkoff (2008).  
14 Runningen (2008) and US DOS (2008).   
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Administration’s support for opposition groups in Bolivia, including funding from USAID, led to the 
expulsion on September 10 of the US Ambassador there; Venezuela expelled the U.S. ambassador as a 
gesture of support, and Washington then expelled the Venezuelan and Bolivian ambassadors.  
 
In another sign of the United States’ declining influence in Latin America and especially South America, 
UNASUR met on September 15 and issued a statement strongly supporting the government of Evo 
Morales. Among the signers were Colombia, Washington’s closest ally in the region, as well as Peru, and 
Chile, the convener of the summit. This demonstrates the importance of structural changes that are 
solidifying Latin America’s independence as well as its pursuit of economic and political integration, 
through such institutions as UNASUR and the Bank of the South. 
 
There are a number of factors that would tend to support current trends in the coming years. First, the 
United States’ market for Latin America’s exports, which expanded very rapidly from 1994-2006, as the 
U.S. trade deficit reached a peak of 6.2 percent of GDP in 2006, will not do so in the years ahead. This is 
because of the reduction of the U.S. trade deficit (see above). The impact will be most felt by countries 
that have “free trade” agreements with the United States, especially Mexico, Canada, Central America, and 
the Caribbean.15 Countries such as Brazil and Argentina, which export less than one percent of GDP to 
the United States, will not be significantly affected. This differential impact will in turn reinforce the 
movement toward diversification away from over-dependence on trade with the United States, including 
Latin American economic integration. It would not be surprising if even Washington’s strongest allies, 
such as Colombia, end up joining such institutions as the Bank of the South. 
 
Declining support for “free trade” agreements, both in Latin America and in the United States, will also 
reduce the relative importance of U.S. commercial relations with Latin America. The proposed “Free 
Trade Area of the Americas,” negotiated between 1994 and 2005 is dead, and the proposed agreement 
between the U.S. and Colombia does not look likely. The economic success of the left governments that 
have been elected over the last decade will also encourage countries to seek more policy space than was 
allowed during the neoliberal era. Venezuela and Argentina, for example, have pursued heterodox 
macroeconomic policies and have had the fastest growing economies in the hemisphere over the last six 
years.16  
 
As the world becomes increasingly multi-polar, U.S. influence will continue to decline not only in Latin 
America but in the rest of the world. The breakdown of negotiations in the World Trade Organization this 
past July, for example, is another manifestation of this process. Developing countries, including India and 
China, are much bigger and more influential than they were when the WTO was created – with rules 
stacked against the developing world – in 1995. Going forward, they will no longer sign off on deals that 
benefit the rich countries at their expense, such as the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) proposals 
that would force steeper proportionate tariff reductions on developing countries than on high-income 
countries in manufacturing – this contributed to the current impasse. 
 
What are we to expect in the realm of changes to U.S. foreign policy if Barack Obama were to win the 
presidency in November? While more moderate than McCain, Obama has adopted some of the same 
hostile rhetoric toward Venezuela, pledged to maintain the embargo on Cuba, and even showed support 
for Colombia’s March 1 raid into Ecuador.17 This was a violation of sovereignty and a dangerous 
regionalization of Colombia’s conflict – supported by the Bush Administration – that was publicly rejected 
by nearly every government in the hemisphere.  
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17 Obama (2008).  
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On the other hand, Obama has said he would meet with President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Raul 
Castro of Cuba. Also, it is difficult to assess the meaning of statements from either candidate as they 
compete for the votes of hundreds of thousands of right-wing Cuban-Americans in Florida, a state with 27 
electoral votes that swung the last two presidential elections. 
 
But the problem is much deeper than the candidates or their beliefs or strategies. There is an influential 
foreign policy establishment based in Washington, which includes the major media and biggest policy 
institutes, as well as key members of Congress and the State Department. This foreign policy establishment 
– ignoring the neoconservatives who are among McCain’s top advisors but would have no role in an 
Obama administration – have a deep-seated world view that is decidedly unsympathetic to the political 
changes that have taken place in Latin America over the last decade.18  Obama’s advisors are very much 
part of that consensus; their main difference with the Bush Administration’s handling of U.S.-Latin 
American relations is that the Administration did not pay sufficient attention to the region.19  
 
If Obama wins, the most likely scenario is that President Chavez will welcome the new administration and 
offer an olive branch. If Obama listens to his advisors, he will reject these overtures in a way that 
reinforces the status quo ante. There is, of course, the possibility that Obama will go against his advisors 
and abandon Washington’s campaign against Venezuela. But that is not the most likely outcome.  
 
Nonetheless, over some years there is likely to be some significant change in U.S. policy toward Latin 
America and the rest of the world under a Democratic congress and president. That is because the bases 
of the two parties are vastly different. This is not noticeable in presidential politics, for a number of 
reasons. Every Democratic U.S. Senator with presidential ambitions voted for the Iraq war. The 
calculation in such decisions is simple: they know that if they vote for the war and it is a disaster, their base 
will forgive them; but if they vote against it and it is a “success,” they will lose some support from the 
center-right (including the media).20 
 
But over time, the difference in the base of the two parties exerts a significant influence on foreign policy. 
This is even more true today than it was 20 years ago, when the Democratic Congress cut off funding to 
the Nicaraguan contras as a result of grass roots pressure. President Reagan was forced to run the war 
from the basement of the White House, with illegal funds, which almost cost him his presidency in the 
Iran-Contra scandal. Among the base of the Democratic party today are millions of people, including 
activists, that see the whole “war on terror” as a farce and do not believe that the United States has either 
the right or need to impose its will on other countries. 
 
The candidates already have some significant differences over other key foreign policy issues. Obama says 
he is willing to negotiate with Iran without preconditions. The present policy towards Iran, which McCain 
would continue if not exacerbate, insists that Iran must suspend the enrichment of uranium before 
negotiations can take place. This is a recipe for military conflict, since Iranians themselves, and not just the 
government, strongly support the idea that they have the right (which they do under international 
agreements) to enrich uranium for peaceful uses. So Obama’s difference with current policy on Iran is 
                                                
18 See, e.g., Castañeda (2006) and (2008),  Hakim (2006), and Shifter (2006) – all in Foreign Affairs, published by the Council on 
Foreign Relations, perhaps the most influential foreign policy publication in the United States. Foreign Affairs articles have been 
consistently hostile to what is referred to as “Latin American populism.”  
19 For example, see Green (2008) and Bachelet (2008).  
20 Hillary Clinton may have lost the presidential primary over her vote for the war, but that is more likely because she defended 
that vote for too long into the primary rather than apologizing for it, as Edwards did. 
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significant. This has implications for the rest of the region. For example, Iran’s co-operation with regard to 
Afghanistan might facilitate a withdrawal from that war.  
 
With regard to Iraq, there are also significant differences. McCain is much more committed to the war 
being a “success,” and thus likely to stay longer and try to maintain a bigger troop presence indefinitely. He 
is more committed to confrontation with Iran, whereas the Iraqi government is likely to pursue close 
relations with Iran. These commitments, plus his own neoconservative world view, would make McCain 
more likely to remain in Iraq for a longer time and with more permanent military bases there. The Iraqi 
government has increasingly been pushing back against the United States; they have forced agreement on a 
timetable for a withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraqi cities and are likely to get an agreement for a 
timetable on overall withdrawal. They have also increasingly confronted Washington with regard to the 
role of foreign oil companies.21   Obama is more likely than McCain to accept these realities sooner. 
 
On Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Israel/Palestine there are less obvious differences between the two 
candidates. Both want to increase troop levels in Afghanistan, and pursue a more aggressive posture 
towards Pakistan. These policies, as well the failure to even oppose the expansion of Israeli settlements in 
the occupied territories, are counter-productive and dangerous. Both candidates also want to expand the 
number of troops in the U.S. military.  
 
On the latter question, the level of national debt that is likely to emerge at the end of this recession and 
bailouts may prove to be a constraint on expanding the military. Although the United States is capable of 
sustaining higher levels of public debt without damage to the economy, there are political constraints that 
come into play, as noted above. At the height of the Vietnam war, when Martin Luther King Jr. warned 
that the War on Poverty was being abandoned because of  military spending, the national debt was about 
43 percent of GDP and falling; as compared to the 67 percent of GDP and rapidly rising debt/GDP ratio 
today. Eventually, Americans may finally begin to see themselves as having to choose between fighting to 
defend an empire in decline, and enjoying the quality of life – including such amenities as universal health 
care – that their counterparts in other rich countries have.  
                                                
21 See, e.g, Thompson (2008), and Glanz and Oppel (2008).  
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